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Abstract—Fundamental limits of secret-key agreement over
reciprocal wireless channels are investigated. We consider a
two-way block-fading channel where the channel gains in the
forward and reverse links between the legitimate terminals are
correlated. The channel gains between the legitimate terminals
are not revealed to any terminal, whereas the channel gains of the
eavesdropper are revealed to the eavesdropper. We propose a two-
phase transmission scheme, that reserves a certain portion of each
coherence block for channel estimation, and the remainder of the
coherence block for correlated source generation. The resulting
secret-key involves contributions of both channel sequences and
source sequences, with the contribution of the latter becoming
dominant as the coherence period increases. We also establish
an upper bound on the secret-key capacity, which has a form
structurally similar to the lower bound. Our upper and lower
bounds coincide in the limit of high signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR)
and large coherence period, thus establishing the secret-key
agreement capacity in this asymptotic regime. Numerical results
indicate that the proposed scheme achieves significant gains
over training-only schemes, even for moderate SNR and small
coherence periods, thus implying the necessity of randomness-
sharing in practical secret-key generation systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer can provide a valuable resource for enhancing
security and confidentiality of wireless communication sys-
tems. One promising method that has received a significant
interest in recent years (see e.g., [1]–[20] and the references
therein) is the generation of a shared secret key using channel
reciprocity. When the terminals use identical carrier frequen-
cies, a physical reciprocity [21] exists between uplink and
downlink channels, which provides a natural mechanism for
key exchange. The terminals first transmit training signals
to estimate the underlying channel gains, then agree on a
common sequence using error correction, and finally distill
a shared secret-key from this common sequence. A number of
experimental testbeds already demonstrate practical viability
of such methods. See e..g., [13], [18]–[20].
Despite this growing interest, information theoretic limits of
secret-key agreement over wireless channels have not received
much attention. Consider a block-fading channel where the
channel gains are sampled once every coherence period and
This work was supported by a Discovery Grant from the Natural Sciences
Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada.
remain constant during the coherence block. Clearly, chan-
nel reciprocity alone achieves a rate that vanishes as the
coherence period increases. What form of signalling within
each coherence block maximizes the secret-key rate? To our
knowledge, only a recent paper [22] considers this question.
The authors consider a separation based scheme. A portion
of each coherence block is reserved for transmission of pilot
symbols to estimate the channel coefficients. The remainder of
the coherence block is used for transmission of a confidential-
message. Unfortunately the authors observe that one cannot
separately tune the two phases. Any rate/power adaptation
done during the message transmission phase, leaks information
about the channel gains to an eavesdropper and in turn reduce
the contribution from reciprocity. As such the wiretap code
for confidential message transmission proposed in [22] does
not involve any rate or power adaptation. It achieves a non-
zero rate only if we impose that the eavesdropper’s channel
on average be weaker than the legitimate receiver’s channel.
If this condition is not satisfied, the secret-key rate achieved
in [22] reduces to the rate achieved using a training only
scheme and vanishes to zero as the coherence period becomes
large.
In the present paper we too consider a separation based
scheme, but substitute the confidential-message transmission
phase with a different communication strategy — randomness
sharing. Following the training phase, in each coherence block
the terminals exchange i.i.d. random variables to generate
correlated source sequences between the terminals. No power
allocation is performed during this phase, yet it results in a
positive secret-key rate even when the eavesdropper’s channel
is on average stronger than the legitimate receiver’s channel.
We note that the randomness sharing scheme for secret-key
generation has been investigated in several previous works (see
e.g., [23]–[28] and references therein). However to the author’s
knowledge, the present paper appears to be the first attempt
that studies randomness sharing, in conjunction with training
techniques, in non-coherent wireless channels. Furthermore
our proposed scheme has several appealing features. First it
achieves a rate that does not vanish in the large coherence-
period limit, thus making it attractive in this practically
relevant regime. Secondly our proposed separation scheme
is asymptotically optimal among all signalling schemes in
the two-way fading channel. In particular, we also establish
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Fig. 1. Problem Setup. There are two legitimate terminals and one eavesdrop-
per terminal. The legitimate terminals A and B are required to agree on a
common secret-key. The fading gains hAB and hBA are not revealed to any
terminals, whereas the gAE and gBE are revealed to the eavesdropper.
an upper bound on the secret-key agreement capacity in the
proposed setup. The upper bound expression is structurally
similar to the lower bound expression and furthermore the
difference between our upper and lower bound vanishes to
zero in the limit of large coherence period and high signal-
to-noise-ratio, thus establishing an asymptotic capacity result.
Numerical results indicate that even for moderate SNR and
relatively small coherence periods the gains resulting from
randomness sharing are significant over training-only schemes.
Our proposed model also differs from reference [22] in that
we only assume imperfect reciprocity in uplink and downlink
channels i.e., we assume that the channel gains in uplink and
downlink are correlated, but not identical. In general achieving
perfect channel reciprocity in baseband is challenging because
different terminals use different I/Q mixers, amplifiers and path
lengths in the RF chains. While closed-loop calibration can
be performed (see e.g. [29], [30]), such methods can become
challenging if the calibration needs to be done in the open air.
Hence we believe that our assumption of imperfect reciprocity
may perhaps be more realistic in practice. Nevertheless we
also note that our coding technique can also be applied to the
case of perfect reciprocity, and improves upon the message
transmission scheme [22].
In other related works, an information theoretic framework
for secure communication was pioneered by Shannon [31].
The problem of secret-key generation from common random-
ness between two legitimate terminals was introduced in [23],
[24]. The setup considered in these papers involves one-
way communication channel models and a public-discussion
channel. In followup works, secret-key agreement capacity
over one-way fading channels with a noiseless public feedback
link have been studied in e.g. [32]–[36]. References [37]–
[39] study secret-key agreement over a channel with two-
sided state sequence, which has application to fading channels.
However these works do not incorporate the cost of acquiring
channel state information which is of critical importance in
the proposed setup.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a setup with two
legitimate terminals A and B and one eavesdropper E. The
terminals A and B communicate over a two-way non-coherent
wireless channel:
yB(t)=hAB(t)xA(t)+nB(t), yA(t)=hBA(t)xB(t)+nA(t),
(1)
zAE(t)=gAE(t)xA(t)+nAE(t), zBE(t)=gBE(t)xB(t)+nBE(t)
(2)
where t ∈ {1, . . . , N} denotes the time index, yA(t) and
yB(t) denote the output symbols at terminals A and B and
{zAE(t), zBE(t)} denote the output symbols at terminal E.
The input symbols generated by terminals A and B at time t
are denoted by xA(t) and xB(t) respectively and are required
to satisfy the average power constraints:
1
N
N∑
t=1
E[|xA(t)|2] ≤ P, 1
N
N∑
t=1
E[|xB(t)|2] ≤ P
The channel gains (hAB , hBA, gAE, gBE) are drawn from a
distribution p(hAB, hBA)p(gAE, gBE) once every T consecu-
tive symbols and stay constant over this period i.e., the channel
gains remain constant in the interval t ∈ [iT +1, (i+1)T ] for
i = 0, 1, . . . , N
T
−1. We assume that the channel gains hAB(t)
and hBA(t) are not revealed to any of the terminals apriori,
whereas the channel gains (gAE(t), gBE(t)) are revealed to
the eavesdropper terminal. The additive noise variables are
drawn from an i.i.d. CN (0, 1) distribution. When computing
the achievable rates, for convenience, we will assume that the
channel gains are all drawn from the Gaussian CN (0, 1) dis-
tribution, although our results are not tied to this assumption.
Remark 1: While we assume that the channel gains of
the eavesdropper are independent of (hAB, hBA), our results
naturally extend to the case when the channel gains are drawn
from a joint distribution p(hAB, hBA, gAE , gBE). Also note
that the eavesdropper observes the transmission from the two
terminals A and B over non-interfering links. An eavesdropper
who observes a superposition of the two signals can only be
weaker than the proposed eavesdropper.
Definition 1 (Secret-Key Capacity): A feasible secret-key
generation protocol is defined as follows. Terminals A and
B sample independent random variables mA and mB from
a product distribution p(mA)p(mB). At time t, terminals A
and B generate the symbols xA(t) = fA(mA, y t−1A ) and
xB(t) = fB(mB, y
t−1
B ). At the end of N channel uses,
the terminals A and B generate secret keys kA and kB
respectively using the functions kA = KA(yNA ,mA) and
kB = KB(yNB ,mB). We require that Pr(kA 6= kB) ≤ εN
and furthermore 1
N
I(kA; z
N , gK) ≤ εN for some sequence
εN that goes to zero as N → ∞. The largest achievable rate
R = 1
N
H(kA) is denoted as the secret-key capacity. 
As our main result, we establish upper and lower bounds on
the secret-key capacity for the two-way non-coherent channel
model.
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Fig. 2. Separation-based approach for secret-key generation. In each coherence
block of length T symbols, the first symbol is dedicated to training and a
power P1 is used i.e., xA(iT + 1) = xB(iT + 1) =
√
P1. The remaining
T − 1 symbols are used for randomness generation. Each symbol is sampled
i.i.d. CN (0, P2) in this phase.
A. Upper Bound
Theorem 1: An upper-bound on the secret-key capacity of
the two-way non-coherent fading channel is,
C ≤ R+ = 1
T
I(hAB ; hBA)+
max
{P (hAB)}∈PAB
{I(yB ; xA|hAB, zAE , gAE)}
+ max
{P (hBA)}∈PBA
{I(yA; xB|hBA, zBE , gBE)} , (3)
where the above expression is evaluated for
xA ∼ CN (0, P (hAB)), xB ∼ CN (0, P (hBA)),
and the set PAB is the set of all non-negative power allocation
functions P (hAB) that satisfy the average power constraint
E[P (hAB)] ≤ P and the set PBA is defined similarly.
Remark 2: The upper bound expression in Theorem 1 has
a natural interpretation. The term 1
T
I(hAB ; hBA) is the contri-
bution arising from reciprocal channel gains. The second term
is the secret key rate achieved over a one way fading channel
yB = hABxA + nB, zAE = gAExA + nAE (4)
and a public discussion channel in the reverse link, when
the fading chain hAB is revealed to all the terminals and the
channel gain gAE is revealed to the eavesdropper. Likewise the
third term is the contribution arising from the one-way fading
channel in the reverse link. The upper bound expression (3)
indicates that the contribution of these three terms is additive.

The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in section III.
B. Lower Bound - Public Discussion
Our proposed coding scheme involves a separation based
approach. As shown in Fig. 2, the first symbol in each
coherence block is reserved for sending a training symbol and
a total power of P1 is used in this phase. This allows the
terminals B and A to generate linear minimum mean squared
error estimates of the channel gains hAB and hBA respectively
i.e.,
hˆAB = αhAB + eAB (5)
hˆBA = αhBA + eBA, (6)
where α = P1
P1+1
is the estimation coefficient, and eAB
and eBA both have the distribution CN (0, α(1− α)) and are
independent of the channel gains hAB and hBA respectively.
For the reminder of coherence block, both the terminals
transmit i.i.d. symbols from CN (0, P2) to generate correlated
source sequences i.e., in coherence period i each component
of the vector x¯A(i) ∈ CT−1 is generated i.i.d. CN (0, P2)
and similarly each component of the vector x¯B(i) is i.i.d.
CN (0, P2). The corresponding received vectors are given by
y¯A(i)=hBA(i)x¯B(i)+n¯BA(i), y¯B(i)=hAB(i)x¯A(i)+n¯AB(i).
(7)
At the end of K such coherence blocks, as indicated in Table I,
terminal A has access to (hˆKBA, x¯KA , y¯KA ) whereas terminal
B has access to (hˆKAB, x¯KB , y¯KB ). The eavesdropper observes
(gKAE , g
K
BE, z¯
K
AE , z¯
K
BE).
TABLE I
CORRELATED SOURCE AND CHANNEL SEQUENCES AT THE TERMINALS
Sequence/Terminal A B E
Channel Sequence hˆKBA hˆ
K
AB (g
K
AE , g
K
BE)
Source Sequence - I x¯K
A
y¯
K
B
z¯
K
AE
Source Sequence - II y¯K
A
x¯
K
B
z¯
K
BE
These correlated sequences are in turn used to generate a
common secret-key by exchanging suitable public messages
in the reconciliation phase [23], [24]. As indicated, in this
section we assume that these public-messages for secret-key
generation are transmitted over an external public discussion
channel. The resulting rate-expression is simpler and has a
form that can be immediately compared with the upper bound.
Subsequently we will remove this assumption and consider
the transmission of public messages directly over the wireless
channel.
Theorem 2: An achievable secret-key rate when an addi-
tional public discussion channel of arbitrarily high rate is
available communication is given by
R−PD =
1
T
I(hˆAB; hˆBA)+
T − 1
T
{
I(yB; xA, hˆAB, hˆBA)− I(yB ; zAE , gAE, hAB)
}
+
T − 1
T
{
I(yA; xB , hˆBA, hˆBA)− I(yA; zBE , gBE , hBA)
}
,
(8)
where we evaluate the expression for xA ∼ CN (0, P2) and
xB ∼ CN (0, P2) and hˆAB and hˆBA are specified in (5) and (6)
respectively and P1 and P2 are non-negative and satisfy the
relation
P1 + (T − 1)P2 ≤ TP. (9)
A proof of Theorem 2 is sketched in Section IV.
Remark 3: The lower bound expression (8) differs in the
following respects from the upper bound expression (3): (i)
the channel gains hAB and hBA in the first term are replaced
by their estimates hˆAB and hˆBA respectively; (ii) the second
and third terms are scaled by a factor of
(
1− 1
T
)
; (iii)
in computing the second and third terms, we assume that
the legitimate receivers have access to the channel estimates
whereas the eavesdropper has access to perfect channel states;
4Training Communication
(T-1)
K Coherence Blocks  1 K
Public Discussion
 2 K
Transmission
Fig. 3. Extension of the proposed coding scheme in absence of public
discussion. A total of K coherence blocks are used for training and source
emulation. Thereafter a total of ε1K coherence blocks are used for transmis-
sion of the public message associated with the channel sequences and another
ε2K coherence blocks are used for the transmission of the public message
associated with the source sequences.
(iv) power allocation across the channel gains is not performed
in the lower bound expression.
An explicit evaluation of the lower bound when that the
channel gains hAB and hBA are jointly Gaussian, zero mean
random variables with a cross-correlation of ρ is as follows.
Proposition 1: An achievable secret-key rate when termi-
nals A and B have access to a public discussion channel is
given by:
R−PD =
1
T
R−P,T +
T − 1
T
(
R−P,AB +R
−
P,BA
)
(10)
where the expressions for R−P,T , R
−
P,AB and R
−
P,BA are given
by:
R−P,T = − log
(
1− α2ρ2) (11)
R−P,AB = E
[
log
(
1+
P2|hAB|2
1 + P2|gAE |2
)]
− log
(
1+
P2
1 + P1
)
(12)
R−P,BA = E
[
log
(
1+
P2|hBA|2
1 + P2|gBE |2
)]
− log
(
1+
P2
1 + P1
)
.
(13)
and α = P11+P1 . 
The proof of Prop. 1 is provided in section IV-D.
C. Lower Bound - No Discussion
When a separate discussion channel is not available, we use
the communication channel for sending the public messages
during the key-generation step as illustrated in Fig. 3. We
also need to quantize the source sequences to satisfy the rate
constraint imposed by the channel.
Theorem 3: An achievable secret-key rate in the absence of
public discussion for the two-way reciprocal fading channel is:
R− =
1
1 + ε1 + ε2
(
1
T
RI +
T − 1
T
RII
)
. (14)
We provide the expressions for RI and RII below, both of
which depend on ε1 and ε2.
RI = I(uAB; hˆBA)+I(uBA; hˆAB)−I(uAB; uBA) (15)
where the random variables uAB and uBA satisfy the Markov
chain
uAB → hˆAB → hˆBA → uBA, (16)
and the rate constraints
I(uAB; hˆAB|hˆBA) ≤ (T − 1)ε1RNC(P ), (17)
I(uBA; hˆBA|hˆAB) ≤ (T − 1)ε1RNC(P ), (18)
where RNC(P ) is an achievable rate for the non-coherent
block fading channel (see e.g., [40]).
The rate expression for RII is expressed as RII = R−AB +
R−BA, where
R−AB = I(vB; xA, u)− I(vB; zAE , gAE , hAB), (19)
R−BA = I(vA; xB , u)− I(vA; zBE , gBE , hBA) (20)
where the random variable u , (uAB, uBA). The random
variables vA and vB in (20) and (19) satisfy the following
Markov Conditions
vA → yA → (u, xB), vB → yB → (u, xA). (21)
as well as the rate constraints:
I(vA; yA|u, xB) ≤ ε2RNC(P ), (22)
I(vB ; yB |u, xA) ≤ ε2RNC(P ). (23)

A proof of Theorem 3 appears in section V.
We further evaluate the rate expression in Theorem 3 for a
Gaussian test channel:
uAB = hˆAB + qAB, uBA = hˆBA + qBA (24)
where qAB, qBA ∼ CN (0, Q1) are Gaussian random variables
independent of all other variables. Similarly we let
vA = yA + wA, vB = yB + wB (25)
where wA,wB ∼ CN (0, Q2) are Gaussian random variables
independent of all other variables.
Proposition 2: An achievable secret-key rate in the absence
of public discussion for the two-way reciprocal fading channel
is given by:
R− =
1
1+ε1+ε2
{
1
T
RI(ε1, P1) +
T − 1
T
RII(ε2, P2)
}
(26)
where P1 and P2 are non-negative and satisfy (9) and ε1 and ε2
are non-negative constants that will be specified in the sequel.
The rate expressions RI and RII are as follows.
RI(ε1, P1) =
−2 log
(
1− α
2ρ2
1 + Q1
α
)
+log

1− α2ρ2(
1 + Q1
α
)2



 (27)
where α = P11+P1 and Q1 satisfies
log
(
1 +
α(1− α2ρ2)
Q1
)
≤ ε1TRNC(P ). (28)
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Fig. 4. Bounds on the SK capacity as a function of SNR for a coherence
period of T = 10.
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= 30dB.
The expression for RII satisfies
RII(ε2, P2)=
{
R−AB(ε2, P2)+R
−
BA(ε2, P2)
}
, (29)
R−AB(ε2, P2)=E
[
log
(
1 +
P2|hAB|2
(1 +Q2)(1 + P2|gAE|2)
)]
− log
(
σ2ABP2
1 +Q2
+ 1
)
, (30)
R−BA(ε2, P2)=E
[
log
(
1+
P2|hBA|2
(1 +Q2)(1 + P2|gBE |2)
)]
− log
(
σ2BAP2
1 +Q2
+ 1
)
, (31)
where
σ2AB = σ
2
BA = 1−
α2
Q1 + α
(32)
and Q2 satisfies
log
(
1 +
σ2ABP2 + 1
Q2
)
≤ ε2RNC(P ). (33)

A proof of Prop. 2 appears in section V-H.
Remark 4: The rate achieved in Prop. 2 reduces to the
rate achieved using public discussion in Prop. 1 when we
take Q1 = Q2 = 0. In particular when Q1 = 0 note that
the expression for RI in (27) immediately reduces to (10).
Furthermore (32) reduces to
σ2AB = σ
2
BA =
1
1 + P1
. (34)
Substituting Q2 = 0, and (34) in (30) and (31) we obtain (12)
and (13) respectively. Thus the rate expressions in Prop. 2 are
consistent with the expressions in Prop. 1 when quantization
(c.f. (24) and (25)) is not introduced.
We also observe that the upper and lower bounds are close
in the high signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) regime.
Corollary 1: In the high SNR regime the upper and lower
bounds satisfy the following relation:
lim
P→∞
R+(P )−R−PD(P ) =
1
T
γ (35)
lim
P→∞
R+(P )−R−(P ) = 1
T
γ (36)
where R+, R−PD and R− are given by (3), (10) and (26)
respectively and
γ ,E
[
log
(
1 +
|hAB|2
|gAE |2
)]
+E
[
log
(
1 +
|hBA|2
|gBE|2
)]
(37)
is a constant that only depends on the distributions
p(hAB)p(gAE) and p(hBA)p(gBE).
A proof of Corollary 1 appears in section VI.
Numerical Comparison:
Fig. 4 shows the bounds on secret-key capacity as a function
of SNR when the coherence period T = 10. Fig. 5 shows the
bounds as a function of the coherence period T when SNR =
35 dB. In Fig. 4 we fix the correlation coefficient in uplink
and downlink gains to ρ = 0.95 while in Fig. 5 it is fixed to
ρ = 0.99.
We make several observations in these plots. The lowermost
plot in both figures corresponds to the best rate any training
based scheme can achieve i.e.,
Rtraining = − 1
T
log(1− ρ2) (38)
In computing (38) we assume that the legitimate receivers have
a genie-aided side information of the respective channel gains
and furthermore no overhead arising from the transmission
of public messages is considered. In Fig. 4 this rate is SNR
independent and in Fig. 5 it decreases to zero as 1
T
.
The upper-most plot in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 is the upper
bound on the secret-key agreement capacity for any scheme.
We note that for small values of T the contribution from
channel-reciprocity term in (3) is dominant. As T increases
6the contribution of this term diminishes and the contribution
from the communication channel increases (c.f. (3)).
The remaining two plots are the lower bounds with and
without public discussion. The lower bound with public
discussion does not involve the overhead of transmitting a
public message. For sufficiently high SNR, it approaches the
upper bound. The lower bound without public discussion does
not come close to the upper in the SNR range of interest.
Nevertheless it achieves a much higher rate than the training
based schemes.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section we provide a proof of Theorem 1. We assume
that the communication is over a total of K coherence blocks
and let N = T ·K denote the total number of channel uses.
Thus the channel state-sequences are of length K whereas
the channel input and output sequences are of length N . We
use the notation hKAB to denote the channel state sequence
of length K and the notation xNA to denote a channel input
sequence of length N . For the eavesdropper, we use the the
notation zN , (zNAE , zNBE) and gK , (gKAE , gKBE).
From the Fano’s inequality and the secrecy constraint we
have that
NR ≤ I(kA; kB)− I(kA; zN , gK) + 2nεn (39)
≤ I(kA; kB|zN , gK) + 2nεn (40)
where εn → 0 as n → ∞. In the following steps the
term εn will be suppressed. Since kA = fA(mA, yNA ) and
kB = fB(mB , y
N
B ), using the data-processing inequality and
the chain rule of mutual information, we have:
NR ≤ I(mA, hKBA, yNA ;mB, hKAB, yNB |zN , gK)
= I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN , gK)+
I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N
A ; yB(N)|zN , gK ,mB, hKAB, yN−1B )
= I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN , gK)+
I(yA(N);mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN , gK ,mA, hKBA, yN−1A )+
I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ; yB(N)|zN , gK ,mB, hKAB, yN−1B )+
I(yA(N); yB(N)|zN, gK ,mB, hKAB, yN−1B ,mA, hKBA,yN−1A ).
(41)
We bound each of the four terms in (41). We show that the
following condition holds
I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN , gK)
≤ I(mA, hKBA, yN−1A ;mB, hKAB, yN−1B |zN−1, gK) (48)
in the steps between (42) and (47) on the top of next page.
Note that (45) follows from the fact that xA(N) is a function
of (mA, yN−1A ) and furthermore zAE(N) is independent of
all other random variables given (xA(N), gAE(N)) (c.f. (2)).
Eq. (47) similarly follows because xB(N) is a function of
(mB, y
N−1
B ) and furthermore zBE(N) is independent of all
other random variables given (xB(N), gBE(N)).
Furthermore, since (yA(N), zBE(N)) are independent of all
other random variables given (xB(N), hBA(N), gBE(N)) we
can show that
I(yA(N);mB , h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN , gK ,mA, hKBA, yN−1A )
≤ I(yA(N); xB(N)|zBE(N), gBE(N), hBA(N)). (49)
and likewise
I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ; yB(N)|zN , gK ,mB, hKAB, yN−1B )
≤ I(xA(N); yB(N)|zAE(N), hAB(N), gAE(N)). (50)
Finally using the fact that xA(N) and xB(N) are functions of
(mA, y
N−1
BA ) and (mB, y
N−1
AB ) respectively and the fact that
yA(N) is independent of all other random variables given
(xA(N), hAB(N)) and similarly yB(N) is independent of all
other random variables given (xB(N), hBA(N)) we can show
that
I(yA(N); yB(N)|zN, gK ,mB, hKAB, yN−1B ,mA, hKBA,yN−1A )
= 0. (51)
Thus substituting (48), (49) and (50) into (41) we have that
NR ≤ I(mA, hKBA, yN−1A ;mB, hKAB, yN−1B |zN−1, gK)
+ I(yA(N); xB(N)|zBE(N), gBE(N), hBA(N))
+ I(xA(N); yB(N)|zAE(N), hAB(N), gAE(N)) (52)
Recursively applying the same steps we have that
NR ≤ I(mA, hKBA; hKAB,mB|gK)+
N∑
i=1
I(xB(i); yA(i)|zBE(i), gBE(i), hBA(i))+
N∑
i=1
I(xA(i); yB(i)|zAE(i), gAE(i), hAB(i)) (53)
= KI(hBA; hAB)+
N∑
i=1
I(xB(i); yA(i)|zBE(i), gBE(i), hBA(i))+
N∑
i=1
I(xA(i); yB(i)|zAE(i), gAE(i), hAB(i)) (54)
where in (54) we use the fact that (mA,mB) are mutually
independent and independent of the channel gains and further-
more (hKAB, h
K
BA) are independent of gK . Finally to establish
the upper bound (3) suppose that we assign a power Pi(hAB)
when the channel gain at time i equals hAB . Using the fact
that a Gaussian input distribution maximizes the conditional
mutual information terms in (54) (see e.g., [41]) we have:
I(xA(i); yB(i)|zAE(i), gAE(i), hAB(i))
≤ E
[
log
(
1 +
Pi(hAB)|hAB|2
1 + Pi(hAB)|gAE |2
)]
. (55)
Thus we have that
N∑
i=1
I(xA(i); yB(i)|zAE(i), gAE(i), hAB(i))
≤
N∑
i=1
E
[
log
(
1 +
Pi(hAB)|hAB|2
1 + Pi(hAB)|gAE |2
)]
(56)
= E
[
N∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
Pi(hAB)|hAB |2
1 + Pi(hAB)|gAE |2
)]
(57)
7I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN , gK) (42)
≤ I(mA, hKBA, yN−1A , zAE(N);mB, hKAB, yN−1B , zBE(N)|zN−1, gK) (43)
= I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B , zBE(N)|zN−1, gK)
+ I(zAE(N);mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B , zBE(N)|zN−1, gK ,mA, hKBA, yN−1A ) (44)
= I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B , zBE(N)|zN−1, gK) (45)
= I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN−1, gK) + I(mA, hKBA, yN−1A ; zBE(N)|zN−1, gK ,mB, hKAB, yN−1B ) (46)
= I(mA, h
K
BA, y
N−1
A ;mB, h
K
AB, y
N−1
B |zN−1, gK) (47)
≤ NE
[
log
(
1 +
1
N
∑N
i=1 Pi(hAB)|hAB|2
1 + 1
N
∑N
i=1 Pi(hAB)|gAE |2
)]
(58)
= NE
[
log
(
1 +
P (hAB)|hAB|2
1 + P (hAB)|gAE |2
)]
, (59)
= NI(xA; yB|zAE , gAE, hAB) (60)
where P (hAB) , 1N
∑N
i=1 Pi(hAB) is the average power
allocated when the fading state equals hAB and (58) uses the
fact that the function f(x) = log
(
1 + ax1+bx
)
is a concave
function in x and hence Jensen’s inequality applies. Also note
that
E[P (hAB)] = E
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(hAB)
]
(61)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[Pi(hAB)] (62)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi ≤ P. (63)
In a similar fashion we can show that
N∑
i=1
I(xB(i); yA(i)|zBE(i), gBE(i), hBA(i))
≤ NE
[
log
(
1 +
P (hBA)|hBA|2
1 + P (hBA)|gBE |2
)]
. (64)
= NI(xB; yA|zBE , gBE, hBA) (65)
The upper bound (3) follows by substituting in (60) and (65)
into (54). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We sketch the coding scheme associated with Theorem 2,
where we assume the availability of a public discussion chan-
nel. In our proof we assume that the channel input and output
symbols as well as the fading gains are discrete valued. We do
not address the discretization of these random variables in this
section; it will be addressed in the proof of Theorem 3, when
we do not assume the availability of a discussion channel.
A. Generation of Correlated Source Sequences
In each coherence block we reserve the first symbol for
transmission of a pilot symbol
xA(iT + 1) = xB(iT + 1) =
√
P1,
i = 0, . . . ,
N
T
− 1. (66)
and the remainder of the symbols for transmission of i.i.d.
random variables i.e.,
xA(t) ∼ pxA(·), xB(t) ∼ pxB (·), ∀t ∈ [1, N ], t 6= iT + 1.
(67)
The legitimate receivers B and A use the corresponding
output symbols yB(iT +1) and yA(iT +1) for estimating the
underlying channel gains hˆAB(i + 1) and hˆBA(i + 1) in (5)
and (6) respectively.
We use the bold-font notation x¯A(t) to denote the sequence
of T − 1 i.i.d. symbols transmitted in coherence block t. and
let y¯B(t) denote the corresponding output symbol vector in
block t. The source sequences at the terminals at the end of
K coherence blocks are indicated in Table I.
B. Information Reconciliation
Terminals A and B exchange public messages over the
discussion channel to agree on identical sequence pair
(hˆKAB, hˆ
K
BA, y¯
K
AB, y¯
K
BA). The public messages transmitted are
as follows (i) Terminal A bins the sequences {hˆKBA} into
2K(H(hˆBA|hˆAB)+ε) bins and transmits the associated bin
index φA over the discussion channel. (ii) Terminal B
bins the sequences {hˆKAB} into 2K(H(hˆAB |hˆBA)+ε) bins and
transmits the associated bin index φB over the discussion
channel. (iii) Terminal A bins the sequences {y¯KA } into
2K(H(y¯A|x¯B ,hˆAB ,hˆBA)+ε) and transmits the associated bin index
ψA over the discussion channel. (iv) Terminal B bins the
sequence {y¯KB } into 2K(H(y¯B |x¯A,hˆAB ,hˆBA)+ε) and transmits the
associated bin index ψB over the discussion channel.
Using standard arguments (see e.g., [42, Chap. 10]) Termi-
nal A can reconstruct the sequence pair (hˆKAB, y¯KB ) (with high
probability) given the messages (φB, ψB) and its side infor-
mation (hˆKBA, x¯KA ). Terminal B can reconstruct the sequence
pair (hˆKBA, y¯KA ) (with high probability) given the messages
(φA, ψA) and its side information sequence (hˆKAB, x¯KB ). Thus
at the end of this phase both terminals have access to the com-
mon sequence pair (y¯KA , y¯KB , hˆKAB, hˆKBA). The eavesdropper has
access to (z¯K , gK , φA, φB, ψA, ψB).
8C. Equivocation Analysis
We lower bound the equivocation at the eavesdropper as
follows:
H(y¯KA , y¯
K
B , hˆ
K
AB, hˆ
K
BA|z¯K , gK , φA, φB, ψA, ψB)
= H(y¯KA , y¯
K
B , hˆ
K
AB, hˆ
K
BA|z¯K , gK)−H(φA)−H(φB)
−H(ψA)−H(ψB)
= H(hˆKAB, hˆ
K
BA) +H(y¯
K
A , y¯
K
B |z¯K , gK , hˆKAB, hˆKBA)
−H(φA)−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (68)
≥ H(hˆKAB, hˆKBA) +H(y¯KA , y¯KB |z¯K , gK , hKAB, hKBA)
−H(φA)−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (69)
=H(hˆKAB, hˆ
K
BA)+H(y¯
K
A |z¯KB , gKBE , hKBA)
+H(y¯KB |z¯KA , gKAE, hKAB)
−H(φA)−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (70)
= KH(hˆAB, hˆBA) +KH(y¯A|z¯B, gBE, hBA)
+KH(y¯B|z¯A, gAE, hAB)
−H(φA)−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (71)
where we use the chain rule of entropy and the fact that
(hˆKAB, hˆ
K
BA) is independent of (z¯K , gK) in (68); in (69) we
use the fact that conditioning reduces entropy as well as hˆKAB
and hˆKBA are independent of the remaining variables gives hKAB
and hKBA respectively; in (70) we use the fact that x¯KA and x¯KB
are sampled independently and hence the following Markov
conditions hold:
y¯
K
A → (z¯KB , gKBE , hKBA)→ (y¯KB , gKAE, hKAB) (72)
y¯
K
B → (z¯KA , gKAE , hKAB)→ (y¯KA , gKBE, hKBA); (73)
Eq. (71) follows from the fact that the sequence pair
(hKAB, h
K
BA) is sampled i.i.d. and furthermore x¯KA and x¯KB are
also sampled i.i.d. Furthermore,
KH(hAB, hBA)−H(φA)−H(φB)
≥ KH(hˆAB, hˆBA)−H(hˆBA|hˆAB)−H(hˆAB|hˆBA)− 4Kε
(74)
= KI(hˆAB; hˆBA)− 4Kε. (75)
Using the fact that x¯A is sampled i.i.d. in (77) and letting
ε′ = ε
T−1 we have
KH(y¯A|z¯B, gBE, hBA)−H(ψA)
≥ KH(y¯A|z¯B, gBE, hBA)−KH(y¯A|x¯B, hˆAB, hˆBA)− 2Kε
(76)
=K(T − 1)
{
H(yA|zB, gBE , hBA)−H(yA|xB , hˆAB, hˆBA)−2ε′
}
(77)
= K(T − 1)
{
I(yA; xB, hˆAB, hˆBA)−I(yA; zB, gBE , hBA)−2ε′
}
.
(78)
In a similar fashion we can show that
KH(y¯B|z¯A, gAE, hAB)−H(ψB)
≥ K(T − 1)
{
I(yB ; xA, hˆAB, hˆBA)−I(yB; zA, gAE, hAB)−2ε′
}
(79)
Combining (75), (78) and (79) we obtain that
H(y¯KA , y¯
K
B , hˆ
K
AB, hˆ
K
BA|z¯K , gK , φA, φB, ψA, ψB)
≥ KI(hˆAB; hˆBA)− 4Kε− 4Kε′
+K(T − 1)
{
I(yA; xB , hˆAB, hˆBA)−I(yA; zB, gBE, hBA)−2ε′
}
+K(T − 1)
{
I(yB ; xA, hˆAB, hˆBA)−I(yB; zA, gAE , hAB)−2ε′
}
(80)
In the final step, the equivocation lower bound in (80) can
be used to generate a secret-key. The associated construction
is discussed in section V-G when we consider the case without
a public discussion channel. We omit the details as they are
completely analogous.
D. Proof of Prop. 1
We evaluate the rate expression (8) in Theorem 2 by
selecting xA ∼ CN (0, P2) and xB ∼ CN (0, P2). Note that
the MMSE estimates of hAB and hBA can be expressed as
hˆAB = αhAB + eAB (81)
hˆBA = αhBA + eBA (82)
where α = P1
P1+1
is the linear MMSE coefficient and
eAB, eBA ∼ CN (0, α(1 − α)) are mutually independent and
independent of (hAB, hBA).
Thus hˆAB and hˆBA are jointly Gaussian random variables
with E[|hˆAB|2] = E[|hˆBA|2] = α and E[hˆAB hˆ†BA] =
α2E[hABh
†
BA]. Hence one can show that
I(hˆAB; hˆBA) = − log
(
1− α2ρ2) . (83)
To compute the remaining terms in (8) note that
I(yA; xB, hˆAB, hˆBA)− I(yA; zB, gBE, hBA)
≥ h(yA|zB, gBE, hBA)− h(yA|xB , hˆAB, hˆBA) (84)
≥ h(yA|zB, gBE, hBA)− h(yA|xB , hˆBA) (85)
The since xB ∼ CN (0, P2), the first-term can be evaluated
as:
h(yA|zB, gBE , hBA) = E
[
log2pie
(
1 +
P2|hBA|2
1 + P2|gBE |2
)]
.
(86)
To evaluate the second term we introduce h˜BA , hBA −
hˆBA. Note that since hˆBA is the MMSE estimate of hBA, we
have that h˜BA ∼ CN (0, 11+P1 ) and hence
h(yA|xB, hˆBA) ≤ h(yA − hˆBAxB) (87)
= h(h˜BAxB + zB) (88)
≤ log 2pie
(
1 +
P2
1 + P1
)
(89)
where we use the fact that conditioning reduces the differential
entropy in (88) and that Gaussian distribution maximizes
entropy among all distributions with a fixed variance in (89).
From (85), (86) and (89) we have that
R−P,BA = I(yA; xB , hˆAB, hˆBA)− I(yA; zB, gBE, hBA) (90)
9= E
[
log
(
1 +
P2|hBA|2
1 + P2|gBE |2
)]
− log
(
1 +
P2
1 + P1
)
(91)
which establishes (13). The expression (12) for R−P,AB can be
established in a similar manner.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In absence of the discussion channel, we need to transmit
the public messages during the error-reconciliation phase using
the same wireless channel. We again use K coherence blocks
to generate source and channel sequences as in Table I using
the training and communication phases as in (66) and (67).
Thereafter we use ε1 ·K coherence blocks for generating the
secret-key from the channel sequences and another ε2 ·K
coherence blocks for generating the secret-key from the source
sequences. Due to this overhead, the total rate achieved is
scaled by a factor of 11+ε1+ε2 as in (26).
In the secret-key generation phase we suitably quantize each
of the channel-state and source sequences to satisfy the rate
constraint for public messages. We describe the key steps of
the coding scheme below.
A. Quantization of Continuous Valued Random Variables
While our lower bound is stated for continuous valued
random variables, in the analysis of our coding scheme, we
follow the approach in [42, pp. 50, sec. 3.4.1] and assume that
associated random variables are discrete valued. In particular
let xB ∼ pxB (·) be any continuous and bounded density
function. We consider an associated quantized version of xB ,
[xB]j ∈ {−j∆,−(j−1)∆, . . . , (j−1)∆, j∆}, with ∆ = 1√j ,
obtained by mapping xB to the closest quantization point such
that |[xB ]j | ≤ |xB| holds. Likewise for yA,j = hBA[xB]j+nA,
let [yA,j ]k be defined in a similar manner. The random vari-
ables [xA]j and [yB,j ]k as well as the variables [uBA]k, [uAB]k,
[vA]k and [vB]k associated with the quantization codebooks
are defined analogously. As we make the quantization finer
and finer, the rate using these discrete random variables will
approach the proposed lower bound with continuous valued
random variables [42, pp. 65, sec. 3.8]. In what follows, we
will treat these random variables as discrete valued and use
the notion of robust-typicality [42, pp. 25-31, sec. 2.4].
B. Codebook Construction
Suitable quantization codebooks for the source and channel
sequences are necessary in order to satisfy the rate-constraint
associated with the wireless channel. Table II illustrates the
different quantization codebooks used in our coding scheme,
which are further described below.
• (Channel Quantization, Node A) CuA: We sample
a total of MuA = 2K(I(uBA;hˆBA)+ε) codewords {uKBA}
i.i.d. each of length K , according to a distribution
puBA(·). These codewords are divided into a total of
T uA = 2
K(I(uBA;hˆBA|hˆAB)+2ε) bins such that there are
NuA = 2
K(I(uBA;hˆAB)−ε) codewords per bin.
• (Channel Quantization, Node B) CuB: We sample a
total of MuB = 2K(I(uAB;hˆAB)+ε) codewords {uKAB} i.i.d.
according to a distribution puAB (·). These codewords are
divided into a total of T uB = 2K(I(uAB;hˆAB |hˆBA)+2ε) bins
such that there are NuB = 2K(I(uAB;hˆBA)−ε) codewords
per bin.
• (Source Quantization, Node A) CvA: We sample a total of
M vA = 2
K(I(v¯A;y¯A)+ε) codewords {v¯KA } i.i.d. according
to the distribution pv¯A(·). These codeword are partitioned
into a total of T vA = 2K(I(v¯A;y¯A|x¯B ,u)+2ε) bins such that
there are N vB = 2K(I(v¯A;x¯B ,u)−ε) codewords per bin.
• (Source Quantization, Node B) CvB: We sample a total of
M vB = 2
K(I(v¯B;y¯B)+ε) codewords {v¯KB } i.i.d. according
to the distribution pv¯B (·). These codewords are parti-
tioned into a total of T vB = 2K(I(v¯B;y¯B |x¯A,u)+2ε) bins such
that there are N vB = 2K(I(v¯B;x¯A,u)−ε) codewords per bin.
C. Encoding
• Terminal A finds a codeword uKBA ∈ CuA that is jointly
typical with hˆKBA. It finds the bin index φA of uKBA and
transmits it as a public message over the channel.
• Terminal B finds a codeword uKAB ∈ CuA that is jointly
typical with hˆKAB . It finds the bin index φB of uKAB and
transmits it as a public message over the channel.
• Terminal A finds a codeword v¯KA ∈ CvA that is jointly
typical with y¯KA . It finds the bin index ψA of v¯KA and
transmits it as a public message over the channel.
• Terminal B finds a codeword v¯KB ∈ CvB that is jointly
typical with y¯KB . It finds the bin index ψB of v¯KB and
transmits it as a public message over the channel.
We let J1 denote the error event that either terminal A or
terminal B fails to find a codeword sequence typical with the
source sequence and let J2 denote the error event associated
with the transmission of the public message.
D. Decoding
Terminal A, upon receiving φB , searches for a codeword
uKAB in the bin-index φB ∈ CuB that is jointly typical with
hˆKBA. It declares an error if none or more than one sequence
are jointly typical. Terminal A, upon receiving ψB , searches
for a codeword v¯KB in the bin-index ψB ∈ CvB that is jointly
typical with (y¯KA , uK). It declares an error if none or more than
one sequence appears to be typical. We define E1 = Pr(uˆKAB 6=
uKAB ∪ ˆ¯vKB 6= v¯KB ).
Terminal B, upon receiving φA, searches for a codeword
uKBA in the bin-index φA ∈ CuA that is jointly typical with hˆKAB .
It declares an error if none or more than one sequences are
jointly typical. Terminal B, upon receiving ψA, searches for a
codeword v¯KA in the bin-index ψA ∈ CvA that is jointly typical
with (y¯KB , uK). It declares an error if none or more than one
sequence appears to be typical. We define E2 = Pr(uˆKBA 6=
uKBA ∪ ˆ¯vKA 6= v¯KA ).
E. Error Analysis (Sketch)
Let E = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ J1 ∪ J2 denote the union of all error
events. It suffices to show that both Ei and Ji have vanish-
ing probabilities for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since the total number of
codeword sequences in CuA equals 2K(I(uBA;hˆBA)+ε), it follows
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TABLE II
QUANTIZATION CODEBOOKS FOR SOURCE AND CHANNEL SEQUENCES
Codebook Total Codewords Total Bins Codewords Per Bin
Channel Quantization (Node A): Cu
A
2K(I(uBA ;hˆBA)+ε) 2K(I(uBA ;hˆBA|hˆAB)+2ε) 2K(I(uBA;hˆAB)−ε)
Channel Quantization (Node B): Cu
B
2K(I(uAB ;hˆAB)+ε) 2K(I(uAB ;hˆAB |hˆBA)+2ε) 2K(I(uAB ;hˆBA)−ε)
Source Quantization (Node A): CvA 2K(I(vA;yA)+ε) 2K(I(vA;yA|xB ,u)+2ε) 2K(I(vA;xB,u)−ε)
Source Quantization (Node B): Cv
B
2K(I(vB ;yB)+ε) 2K(I(vB ;yB|xA,u)+2ε) 2K(I(vB ;xA,u)−ε)
from the Covering Lemma [42, pp. 62, Lemma 3.3] that the
probability that no jointly typical codeword exists goes to zero
as K →∞. By a similar argument we have that Pr(J1)→ 0.
Since H(φA) ≤ K(I(uBA; hˆBA|hˆAB) + 2ε) and since the rate
constraint (18) is imposed, terminal B decodes φA with
high probability. In a similar fashion it can be argued that
Pr(J2)→ 0 as K →∞. Since the total number of codewords
in each bin of CuB is 2K(I(uAB;hˆBA)−ε) it follows from the
Packing Lemma [42, pp. 46, Lemma 3.1] that terminal A will
decode {uˆKAB = uKAB} with high probability. By analogous
arguments it can be verified that Pr(E1)→ 0 and Pr(E2)→ 0
as K →∞.
F. Equivocation Analysis
Let us define z¯K = (z¯KA , z¯KB ) and gK = (gKAE , gKBE). We
first consider the conditional entropy term1
H(uKBA, u
K
AB, v¯
K
A , v¯
K
B |φA, φB, ψA, ψB, z¯K , gK) ≥
≥ H(uKBA, uKAB, v¯KA , v¯KB |z¯K , gK)−H(φA)
−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (92)
= H(uKBA, u
K
AB|z¯K , gK)
+H(v¯KA , v¯
K
B |uKBA, uKAB, z¯K , gK)
−H(φA)−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (93)
= H(uKBA, u
K
AB) +H(v¯
K
A , v¯
K
B |uKBA, uKAB, z¯K , gK)
−H(φA)−H(φB)−H(ψA)−H(ψB) (94)
where (94) follows from the fact that (uKBA, uKAB) are inde-
pendent of (x¯KA , x¯KB ) and hence (z¯K , gK).
From the construction recall that φA, φB , ψA and ψB denote
the bin indices in CuA, CuB , CvA and CvB respectively. Therefore
H(φA) ≤ I(uBA; hˆBA|hˆAB) + 2ε, (95)
H(φB) ≤ I(uAB; hˆAB|hˆBA) + 2ε, (96)
H(ψA) ≤ I(v¯A; y¯A|x¯B, u) + 2ε, (97)
H(ψB) ≤ I(v¯B; y¯B|x¯A, u) + 2ε. (98)
Thus we need to lower bound the joint-entropy terms in (94).
We use the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: Consider a triplet of random variables (u, x , y)
that satisfy u → x → y . Suppose that the sequence xn is
sampled i.i.d. px(·). Suppose that we generate a set A con-
sisting of M = 2nR sequences {un(i)}1≤i≤M each sampled
i.i.d. from a distribution pu(·). Given xn we select an index L
such that (xn, un(L)) ∈ T nε (x , u). If no such index exists we
1All the expressions are conditioned on the codebook C. We suppress this
conditioning for sake of convenience.
select L uniformly at random. If yn is sampled i.i.d. from the
conditional distribution py|x(·|·), then
H(yn|un(L)) ≥ n {H(y |u) + I(x ; u)−R− γn(ε))} (99)
for any R > I(x ; u) and for some γn(ε) that goes to zero as
ε→ 0 and n→∞.
Proof: See Appendix A
We first lower bound the term H(uKBA, uKAB). Notice that
uKBA → hˆKBA → uKAB holds. Since uKBA and uKAB are
distributed, nearly uniformly on the codebooks CuA and CuB
respectively (see e.g., [43, pp. 660, Lemma 1]) we have that
H(uKBA) ≥ K(I(uBA; hˆBA)− γK(ε)) (100)
H(uKAB) ≥ K(I(uAB; hˆAB)− γK(ε)) (101)
Substituting x = hˆAB , y = hˆBA and u = uBA and R =
I(uBA; hˆAB) + 2ε in Lemma 1 we have that
H(hˆKBA|uKBA) ≥ K
{
H(hˆBA|uBA)− γK(ε)
}
. (102)
We define the indicator function Iε(hˆKBA, uKAB, uKBA) to
equal 1 if (hˆKBA, uKAB, uKBA) ∈ T Kε and zero otherwise.
Using the Markov Lemma [42, sec 12.1.1] we have that
Pr(I(hˆKBA, u
K
AB, u
K
BA) = 1)→ 1 as K →∞ for every ε > 0.
Hence
H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB) ≤ H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB, Iε) + 1 (103)
≤ H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB, Iε = 1)Pr(Iε = 1)+
H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB, Iε = 0)Pr(Iε = 0) + 1 (104)
Now consider
H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB, Iε = 1) ≤ E
[
log |T Kε (hˆBA|uKA , uKB )|
]
≤ K(H(hˆBA|uBA, uAB) + γK(ε)) (105)
where the last step follows from the bound on the size of a
conditionally typical set [42, pp. 27].
Furthermore since Pr(Iε = 0) → 0 as K → ∞ we have
that (104) simplifies to the following
H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB) ≤ K
{
H(hˆBA|uBA, uAB) + γK(ε)
}
(106)
We have the following lower bound on H(uKBA, uKAB):
H(uKBA, u
K
AB) = H(u
K
BA|uKAB) +H(uKAB) (107)
= H(uKBA, hˆ
K
BA|uKAB)−H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB) +H(uKAB)
(108)
≥ H(hˆKBA|uKAB)−H(hˆKBA|uKBA, uKAB) +H(uKAB) (109)
≥ K
{
I(hˆBA; uBA|uAB) + I(hˆAB; uAB)− γK(ε)
}
(110)
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= K
{
I(hˆBA; uBA)+I(hˆAB; uAB)−I(uBA; uAB)−3γK(ε)
}
(111)
where we use (102) and (106) in (110).
Now consider
H(v¯KA , v¯
K
B |uKBA, uKAB, z¯K , gK)
≥ H(v¯KA , v¯KB |uKBA, uKAB, z¯K , gK , hKAB, hKBA) (112)
= H(v¯KA |hKBA, z¯KB , gKBE) +H(v¯KB |hKAB, z¯KA , gKAE) (113)
where (112) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy and (113) follows from the fact that (x¯KA , x¯KB ) are
generated mutually independently and hence the associated
Markov chain holds. We lower bound each of the two terms
in (113)
H(v¯KA |hKBA, z¯KB , gKBE)
= H(hKBA, z¯
K
B , g
K
BE |v¯KA ) +H(v¯KA )−H(hKBA, z¯KB , gKBE)
= H(hKBA, z¯
K
B , g
K
BE |v¯KA ) +H(v¯KA )−KH(hBA, z¯B, gBE)
(114)
≥ H(hKBA, z¯KB , gKBE |v¯KA )+
KI(v¯A; y¯A)−KH(hBA, zB, gBE)−KγK(ε) (115)
≥ K
{
H(hBA, z¯B, gBE |v¯A)+
I(v¯A; y¯A)−H(hBA, z¯B, gBE)− γK(ε)
}
(116)
= K {I(v¯A; y¯A)− I(v¯A; z¯B, hBA, gBE)− γK(ε)} (117)
where (114) follows from the fact that (hKAB, z¯KB , gKBE) are
sampled i.i.d. and (115) follows from the fact that v¯KA is
distributed nearly uniformly over the set CvA (see e.g., [43,
pp. 660, Lemma 1]) and (116) follows from Lemma 1
by substituting u = v¯A, y = (hBA, z¯B, gBE), x = yA and
R = I(y¯A; v¯A) + 2ε. In a similar manner we can show that
H(v¯KB |hKAB, z¯KA , gKAE)
≥ K {I(v¯B; y¯B)− I(v¯B; z¯A, hAB, gAE)− γK(ε)} (118)
Substituting (95)-(98), (111), (117) and (118) into (94) we
have established that
1
K
H(uKBA, u
K
AB, v¯
K
A , v¯
K
B |φA, φB , ψA, ψB, z¯K , gK) ≥
I(hˆAB; uBA) + I(hˆBA; uAB)− I(uBA; uAB)+
I(v¯B; x¯A, u)− I(v¯B; hAB, gAE, z¯A)+
I(v¯A; x¯B, u)− I(v¯A; hBA, gBE , z¯B)− γK(ε). (119)
Now observe that
I(v¯B; x¯A, u)− I(v¯B; hAB, gAE , z¯A)
= I(v¯B; x¯A, u)− I(v¯B; hAB, gAE, z¯A, u) (120)
= H(v¯B|hAB, gAE, z¯A, u)−H(v¯B|x¯A, u)
= (T − 1) {H(vB |hAB, gAE, zA, u)−H(vB|xA, u)} (121)
= (T − 1) {I(vB ; xA, u)− I(vB; hAB, gAE , zA, u)}
= (T − 1) {I(vB ; xA, u)− I(vB; hAB, gAE , zA)} (122)
where (121) follows from the fact that x¯A ∈ CT−1 is sampled
i.i.d. pxA(·) (120) and (122) follow from the fact that u →
(z¯A, gAE, hAB)→ y¯B → v¯B holds.
In a similar way we can show that
I(v¯A; x¯B, u)− I(v¯A; hBA, gBE, z¯B)
= (T − 1) {I(vA; xB, u)− I(vA; hAB, gBE, zB)} (123)
By substituting (122) and (123) into (119) we have that
1
N
H(uKBA, u
K
AB, v¯
K
A , v¯
K
B |φA, φB , ψA, ψB, z¯K , gK) ≥
1
T
{
I(hˆAB; uBA) + I(hˆBA; uAB)− I(uBA; uAB)
}
+
(T − 1)
T
{I(vB; xA, u)− I(vB ; hAB, gAE , zA)}+
(T − 1)
T
{I(vA; xB , u)− I(vA; hAB, gBE , zB)} γK(ε)
, Req − γK(ε) (124)
G. Secret-Key Generation
It remains to show that a secret-key can be generated at
the legitimate terminals that achieves a rate Req in (124) and
satisfies the secrecy constraint.
We consider M i.i.d. repetitions of the coding scheme in
the previous section. Let
ØM = (vM·KA , v
M·K
B , u
M·K
AB , u
M·K
BA ) (125)
denote the common sequence at the legitimate terminals after
M such repetitions. Note that ØM is sampled i.i.d. from the
joint distribution p(vKA , vKB , uKAB, uKBA). Similarly let
TM ,
(
φMA , φ
M
B , ψ
M
A , ψ
M
B , z¯
M·K , gM·K
) (126)
denote the observation sequence at the eavesdropper which is
also sampled i.i.d. and furthermore from (124) we have that
1
K
H(Ø|T) ≥ Req − γK,ε. (127)
Given the common sequence ØM at the legitimate receivers
and the sequence TM at the eavesdropper, sampled i.i.d. from
a joint distribution, for any rate R < H(Ø|T) and δ > 0
there exists a secret-key codebook (see e.g., [42, sec. 22.3.2,
pp. 562-563]) such that the secret-key k satisfies
lim
M→∞
1
MK
H(k) ≥ (R− δ), lim
M→∞
1
MK
I(k ; TM ) ≤ δ.
Furthermore for each M , by selecting K sufficiently large,
we can make γK,ε sufficiently small and also guarantee that
the error probability in decoding ØM goes to zero. Thus we
can achieve a secret-key rate arbitrarily close to Req. This
completes the proof of our lower bound.
H. Proof of Prop. 2
We evaluate the rate expression in Theorem 3 for jointly
Gaussian input distribution. Recall that hˆAB and hˆBA are
the MMSE estimates of the channel gains hAB and hBA
respectively. Hence we can decompose,
hAB = hˆAB + eAB, hBA = hˆBA + eBA (128)
where hˆAB ∼ CN (0, α), hˆBA ∼ CN (0, α) are the estimates
and eAB ∼ CN (0, 1 − α), eBA ∼ CN (0, 1 − α) are the
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estimation errors and where α = P1
P1+1
. For the test channels
in (24) we can show the following:
I(uAB; hˆAB) = I(uBA; hˆBA) = log
(
1 +
α
Q1
)
(129)
I(uAB; hˆBA)=I(uBA; hˆAB)= − log
(
1− α
2ρ2
1 + Q1
α
)
(130)
I(uAB; hˆAB)− I(uAB; hˆBA)
= log
(
1 +
α(1− α2ρ2)
Q1
)
= I(uBA; hˆBA)− I(uBA; hˆAB) (131)
I(uAB; uBA) = − log

1− α2ρ2(
1 + Q1
α
)2

 (132)
Substituting in (15), (17) and (18) we have that
RI=
1
T
{
I(uAB; hˆBA)+I(uBA; hˆAB)−I(uAB; uBA)
}
=
1
T

−2 log
(
1− α
2ρ2
1 + Q1
α
)
+log

1− α2ρ2(
1 + Q1
α
)2




(133)
where Q1 is selected to satisfy:
log
(
1 +
α(1 − α2ρ2)
Q1
)
≤ ε1(T − 1)RNC(P ). (134)
We next obtain expression for R−BA using the test chan-
nel (25).
R−BA = I(vA; xB, uAB, uBA)− I(vA; hAB, zB, gBE) (135)
= h(vA|hAB, zB, gBE)− h(vA|uAB, uBA, xB) (136)
we bound each of the two entropy terms as follows.
h(vA|hAB, zB, gBE) (137)
= E
[
log
(
1 +Q2 +
P2|hBA|2
1 + P2|gBE|2
)]
+ log(2pie) (138)
and furthermore
h(vA|uAB, uBA, xB)
≤ h(h˜BAxB + qBA + nBA) (139)
≤ log (σ2ABP2 +Q2 + 1)+ log(2pie). (140)
where
h˜BA = hBA − hˆBA
is the error in the MMSE estimate of hBA given (uAB, uBA)
and σ2AB is the associated estimation error
σ2AB = E[(hAB − hˆAB)2] (141)
The upper bound in (140) follows from the fact that a Gaussian
input maximizes the differential entropy for a given noise
variance. The expression in (30) follows by substituting (138)
and (140) into (136). In a similar way we can establish (31).
The rate constraint in (22) and (23) follow by substituting (25)
into
I(vA; yA|xA, uAB, uBA) ≤ ε2RNC(P ). (142)
Note that
I(vA; yA|xA, uAB, uBA)
= h(vA|xA, uAB, uBA)− h(qBA) (143)
≤ log
(
1 +
σ2ABP2 + 1
Q1
)
. (144)
The expression (33) follows from (142) and (144).
Finally the bound on σ2AB in (32) is obtained as follows
σ2AB = E[(hAB − hˆAB(uAB, uBA))2]
≤ E[(hAB − hˆAB(uAB))2] ≤ 1− α
2
Q1 + α
(145)
This completes the proof of Prop. 2.
VI. PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We establish (35) and (36) respectively.
We consider the expression for R+ in Theorem 1 and show
that
lim
P→∞
R+ = − 1
T
log(1− ρ2) + γ (146)
where γ is defined in (37). In particular note that the first
term in (3) is independent of P and furthermore since hAB
and hBA are jointly Gaussian, zero mean, unit variance and
with a cross-correlation of ρ it can be readily shown that
I(hAB; hBA) = − log(1− ρ2). (147)
Only the second and third terms depend on P . For any power
allocation P (hAB) note that
E
[
log
(
1 +
P (hAB)|hAB|2
1 + P (hAB)|gAE |2
)]
≤ E
[
log
(
1 +
|hAB|2
|gAE |2
)]
(148)
which follows since the function f(x) = ax1+bx is increasing
in x for any a, b > 0. Similarly we have
E
[
log
(
1 +
P (hBA)|hBA|2
1 + P (hBA)|gBE |2
)]
≤ E
[(
1 +
|hBA|2
|gBE |2
)]
.
(149)
Furthermore since a Gaussian input distribution maximizes the
conditional mutual information (c.f. (55)), the upper bound
follows by substituting (148) and (149) into (3).
We next show that,
lim
P→∞
R−PD = −
1
T
log(1 − ρ2) + T − 1
T
γ. (150)
In particular we consider the secret-key rate expression (10)
in Prop. 1. We select P2 =
√
P
T−1 and P1 = P −
√
P . Note
that as P → ∞ we have that P1, P2 → ∞ and P2P1 → 0. In
particular, since α = P1
P1+1
we have that
lim
P1→∞
− log(1 − α2ρ2) = − log(1− ρ2), (151)
lim
P→∞
log
(
1 +
P2
1 + P1
)
= 0. (152)
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Furthermore since the function f(x) = ax1+bx is bounded for all
a, b > 0 we can apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem,
lim
P2→∞
E
[
log
(
1 +
P2|hAB|2
1 + P2|gAE |2
)]
=E
[
log
(
1 +
|hAB|2
|gAE |2
)]
(153)
lim
P2→∞
E
[
log
(
1 +
P2|hBA|2
1 + P2|gBE |2
)]
=E
[
log
(
1 +
|hBA|2
|gBE |2
)]
(154)
Substituting (151), (152), (153), (154) into (10), (11), (12),
(13) we recover (150). Comparing (150) and (146) we estab-
lish (35).
To establish (36) we consider (26) in Prop. 2 and show that
with a suitable choice of Q1, Q2, P1 and P2 we have that
lim
P→∞
R− = − 1
T
log(1 − ρ2) + T − 1
T
γ. (155)
In particular we select P2 =
√
P
T−1 and P1 = P −
√
P .
Furthermore we select
Q1 =
α(1 − α2ρ2)
ε1(T − 1)RNC(P ) (156)
Q2 =
σ2ABP2 + 1
ε2RNC(P )
(157)
Note that as P → ∞, it is well known that RNC(P ) → ∞.
Thus we can let ε1 and ε2 to be any functions of P such that
ε1(P ), ε2(P ) → 0 and εi(P )RNC(P ) → ∞. Then observe
that Q1, Q2 → 0 as P →∞ It therefore follows that
lim
P→∞
RI(ε1, P ) = − 1
T
log(1− ρ2), (158)
lim
P→∞
log
(
1 +
σ2ABP2
1 +Q2
)
= 0. (159)
and hence we have
lim
P→∞
R−AB = E
[
log
(
1 +
|hAB|2
|gAE |2
)]
(160)
lim
P→∞
R−BA = E
[
log
(
1 +
|hBA|2
|gBE |2
)]
(161)
By substituting (158), (160) and (161) into (26) we ob-
tain (155).
VII. CONCLUSION
We study secret-key agreement capacity over a two-way,
non-coherent, reciprocal, block-fading channel. Our main ob-
servation is that a separation based scheme that judiciously
combines channel-training and randomness-sharing techniques
is an efficient approach when the coherence block length is
large and the high signal-to-noise is high. Numerical results
indicate that even when the overhead of transmitting public
messages is accounted for, the proposed scheme outperforms
a idealized training-only schemes for moderate SNR and
relatively small coherence block-lengths. These observations
suggest that when the channel fluctuations are relatively slow,
one should not rely on channel reciprocity alone for secret-key
generation. We also establish an upper bound on the secret-key
agreement capacity and show that the upper and lower bounds
coincide asymptotically.
In terms of future work a number of interesting directions
remain to be explored. The secret-key agreement capacity in
the low signal to noise ratio regime remains to be studied.
Potentially improved upper and lower bounds for moderate
SNR may be also obtained. While our upper bound and lower
bounds naturally extend to the case of multiple antennas
a detailed analysis is left for future work. We note that
some preliminary investigation along these lines has appeared
in [44].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We lower bound the conditional entropy term as follows
H(yn|un(L)) = H(yn, xn|uN (L))−H(xn|yn, un(L))
(162)
≥ H(yn, xn)−H(un(L))−H(xn|yn, un(L)) (163)
= nH(y , x)−H(un(L))−H(xn|yn, un(L)) (164)
≥ nH(y , x)− nR−H(xn|yn, un(L)) (165)
where (164) follows from the fact that (xn, yn) are sampled
independently of A and (165) follows from the fact that |A| =
2nR. It only remains to upper bound the conditional entropy
term in (165). Let Iε′ denote an indicator function that equals 1
if (xn, yn, un) ∈ T nε′(x , y , u) and equals zero otherwise. From
the conditional typicality lemma we have that Pr(Iε′ = 1)→ 1
as n→∞, for any ε′ > ε.
H(xn|yn, uN (L)) ≤ 1 +H(xn|yn, uN (L), I) (166)
= 1 +H(xn|yn, uN (L), I = 1)Pr(I = 1)
+H(xn|yn, uN (L), I = 0)Pr(I = 0) (167)
≤ 1 +H(xn|yn, uN (L), I = 1) + nH(x) Pr(I = 0) (168)
≤ 1 + E[log |T nε′ (x |un, yn)|] + nH(x) Pr(I = 0) (169)
≤ 1 + nH(x |u, y) + nγ(ε) + nγn(ε) (170)
where we use the fact that for any ε > 0, Pr(I = 0) →
0 as n → ∞ in (168), which follows since R > I(x ; u).
Combining (165) and (170) we get
H(yn|un(L)) ≥ n {H(y , x)−H(x |y , u) −R− γn(ε)}
(171)
= n {H(y |x) +H(x)−H(x |u) + I(x ; y |u)−R − γn(ε)}
(172)
= n {H(y |u) + I(x ; u)−R− γn(ε)} , (173)
where the last step uses the fact that u → x → y .
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